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Introduction 
 
The executive veto of a judicial decision by the UK attorney general, namely, Dominic 
Grieve, to block the disclosure of letters written by Prince Charles to politicians was a 
blow to freedom of information (FOI). For nine years, the government resisted the FOI 
request from the Guardian for 27 pieces of correspondence between the heir to the 
throne and the ministers of seven government departments. In R (Evans) v HM Attorney 
General [2014] EWCA Civ 254 the court ruled that Grieve's executive overrule was 
unlawful. The government is set to appeal. But the use of a veto, in any event, and the 
ongoing saga is all in quite remarkable contrast to the operational practicalities of the 
FOI law in Scotland; and there are far more distinct differences between the home 
nation regimes still further.  
 
Scotland finds itself so often in receipt of praise for having a stronger freedom of 
information regime. Media narration of high profile refusal notices south of the border, 
disclosures and, of course, any ensuing scandal which follows have been, perhaps, key 
to this all-too-common view. Are the overtures made to Scottish FOI otherwise justified? 
How the legislative differences play out on the ground is unknown: the consequences, if 
any, unheard. The Scottish provisions do, in actual fact, legislate for far stronger 
information rights for the applicant but there is, put plainly, a distinct paucity in any 
research which concerns comparative law and practice. 
 
This article offers such a comparative evaluation of the home nation FOI Acts - namely, 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000) and the Freedom of Information 
(Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA 2002) - to provide a fundamental overview and an 
investigation of the diverging trajectory in operational practicality. The analysis of the 
statutes is complemented by case law, a nod to contemporaneous events and official 
information which, in all the circumstances, suggests that UK back-peddling and reverse-
engineering is weakening FOIA 2000 while FOISA 2002, to the contrary, maintains 
stronger information rights for the applicant. 
 
Technical similarities and a shared platform 
 
There are some important affinities between the regimes which, at times, distinguish the 
home nation Acts from their international counterparts. There is also something of a 
special relationship between FOIA 2000 and FOISA 2002 which determines under which 
regime a request for information is to be considered; this seems an appropriate place to 
start a comparative evaluation. 
 
FOIA 2000 provides a right of access to information held by public authorities. At s 1 the 
right to know is established by placing two related obligations on public authorities: First, 
when an applicant requests information a public authority has a duty to write to the 
applicant saying whether it holds the information. This is known as the duty to confirm 
or deny. And second, if the authority does hold the information it must communicate it 
to the applicant. FOISA 2002 provides a single right: to be provided the information.1 
This difference, one of many, is largely aesthetic with no disparity to real-world practice. 
Differences, with little consequence, such as the general right, of course run throughout 
the parallel statutes; while the Acts are two different beasts they are, at least, of the 
same pedigree. 
 
FOISA 2002, following a lengthy consultation period (1999-2001), followed on from the 
UK FOIA which had received Royal Assent in 2000. Coalition meant that the composition 
RI6FRWODQG¶VILUVWSRVW-devolution government involved internal balances of ministerial 
portfolios; the Liberal Democrat control of Justice afforded the party influence over 
freedom of information. The statutes, by agreement from the legislative centres and 
FRQWUDU\WRWKHRULJLQDOWLPHWDEOLQJERWKFDPHLQWRIRUFHRQ1HZ<HDU¶V'D\-DQuary 
2005. The UK, in turn giving way to Scotland, joined a world of FOI subscribers as 
something of a Johnny-come-lately: decades after its US cousin (1966) and 
commonwealth partners New Zealand (1982), Australia (1982) and Canada (1983). 
 
FOISA 2002 provides any person who requests information from a µScottish public 
authority¶ which holds it a right, subject to conditions, to be provided with the 
information by the authority. FOIA 2000 applies to public authorities of the other home 
nations as well as to UK-wide public authorities, regardless of whether or not they 
operate in Scotland. Information held by µUK public authorities¶ operating only from 
Scotland, such as the Northern Lighthouse Board, as well as cross-border authorities, 
such as the BBC, are subject to FOIA 2000. Any public authority, to which freedom of 
information legislation applies, is subject to only one regime. It is irrespective of whether 
that information relates to reserved or devolved matters. Furthermore, FOIA 2000 
provides that information supplied by a Minister of the Crown or by a department of the 
8.*RYHUQPHQWDQGKHOGµLQFRQILGHQFH¶LVQRWIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH6FRWWLVK$FWKHOd 
by the receiving Scottish public authority.2 In effect, the information belongs to the UK 
and is not to be regulated, for the purposes of FOI, by the Scottish regime. The 
information instead falls under the provisions of the harsher FOIA 2000 tests for 
disclosure and the jurisdiction of England and Wales.3 There is no corresponding 
provision for information provided by the Scottish Ministers, for example, which is 
provided to their UK counterparts. To this extent the Scottish regime is on a loose lead 
and can be reined in on where certain information is disseminated from south of the 
border or to information which is otherwise produced in Scotland but perceived to be 
distinctly British. One could argue that the harmony of the parallel regimes relies upon 
FOIA 2000 taking a position of the parent or guardian to its Scottish counterpart. It is 
the dominant piece of legislation.  
 
7KHJUHDWHVWDIILQLW\LVZKHUHERWKUHJLPHVH[WHQGWKHULJKWWRNQRZWRµDQ\SHUVRQ¶LQ
this respect the Acts are universal and non-discriminatory of citizenship.4 This is not the 
norm in respect of the international experience: the USA, New Zealand and the 
newcomers such as Malta, Israel and Jamaica, to name but a few, contain citizenship or 
residency requirements. Both Scotland and the UK adopted the revered Swedish model 
of right to know universalism. It is undoubtedly beneficial to international policy makers, 
the global third sector, researchers and academics employing FOI. Consider, for one, 
historians accessing the National Archives. However, UK Minister of State for Justice, 
namely, Simon Hughes, earlier this year indicated that a consultation will be undertaken 
to review the applicant eligibility rules with a view to imposing restrictions in FOIA 2000.5  
                                                 
1 FOISA 2002, s 1(1). 
2 FOIA 2000, s 3(2)(a)(ii). 
3 See (eg) Scottish Decision 036/2009. 
4 FOIA 2000, s 1(1) and FOISA 2002, s 1(1). 
5 HC Deb, 18 March 2014, cols 638-639. 
 Universalism leads us to the applicant blind principle adopted by both regimes. A 
disclosure under FOI, in any jurisdiction, constitutes a disclosure to the world at large. 
Both home nation Acts are designed to be applicant blind. In view of this, the UK 
Information Commissioner (IC) and Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) cannot 
take into account the often unique position of an applicant in determining a disclosure. 
For example, in Scottish Decision 029/2008, the applicant, a mother, requested 
information contained in her deceased son's social work records. But as the mother, for 
the purposes of FOISA 2002, the applicant is in the same position as a person with no 
prior relationship with the son.6 7KHUHTXHVWHU¶VSULYDWHLQWHUHVWVDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\WKH
same as the public interest. What may serve the private interests of the requester 
might, bearing in mind the probability for wider dissemination of a FOI disclosure, in 
actual fact, constitute a detriment to the public interest especially where the wider 
concerns for privacy and confidentiality are relevant. The requester is an applicant equal 
to any other person seeking a disclosure to the world. 
 
It is, of course, at times inherently difficult in all the circumstances for a public authority 
to maintain the applicant blind approach. Scottish Decision 280/2013 concerned a 
UHTXHVWIURPDQDSSOLFDQWLQWHUQHGE\WKH6FRWWLVK3ULVRQ6HUYLFH636IRUWKHµ+DOO
5HJLPH3ODQ¶The applicant ZDVWROGXSRQKLVUHTXHVWWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQµZDVDYDLODEOH
IURPODQGLQJVWDII¶7 The applicant requested a review of the SPS decision as he was 
unable to locate a copy. In response to the request for review, the SPS notified the 
applicant that his request should have been processed in a formal manner in line with 
FOI law. The public authority enclosed a copy of the Hall Regime Plan and, in turn, re-
established the applicant blind approach successfully. After all, not everyone has access 
to the prison hall or landing staff. In other words, the response was one which would 
have mirrored WKDWLQDOOEXWWKHUHFLSLHQW¶VQDPHWRDQ\RWKHUDSSOLFDQWXQGHU)2,6$
2002. The maintenance of the applicant blind position is echoed in the guidance of the 
UK IC: 
 
µ7KHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLVVXHVWKDWFRPHLQWRSOD\ZKHQDTXDOLILHGH[HPSWLRQLVHQJDJHGDUH 
about the effect of making the information public, not the effect of giving it to a 
SDUWLFXODUUHTXHVWHU¶8 
 
The position has also been upheld in UK case law: Hilary Benn MP, Shadow Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government, wrote on 07 January 2013 to the IC 
alleging that the responses to his FOI requests from his counterpart, namely, Eric 
Pickles, were nothing short of systematic refusals.9 Non-cRPSOLDQFHE\3LFNOHV¶
Department was said to be justified, among other reasons, because disclosure under FOI 
WRDPHPEHURI+HU0DMHVW\¶V2SSRVLWLRQHQWDLOHGµWKHSURVSHFWRISROLWLFDODQGPHGLD
exposXUH>@EHLQJPRUHOLNHO\¶.10 In other words, the adopted view was that requests 
should not be complied with where they had an identifiable and, in the view of the public 
DXWKRULW\REMHFWLRQDEOHPRWLYH7KH,QGHSHQGHQW¶V:KLWHKDOl editor commented at the 
time: 
 
µ/DERXUVDLGLWZDV³VFDQGDORXV´WKDWWKH*RYHUQment was wasting public money on 
³GHVSHUDWHO\WU\LQJWRDYRLGEHLQJWUDQVSDUHQW´%XWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVDFFXVHGWKHSDUW\
RIJRLQJRQD³JORULILHGILVKLQJH[SHGLWLRQ´DQGLQVLVWHGWKDWPLQLVWHUVDOZD\VIROORZHG
³KLJKHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV´LQGHDOLQJZith requHVWVIRULQIRUPDWLRQ¶11 
 
                                                 
6 para 12. 
7 para 2. 
8 ICO Guidance: The public interest test at para 40. 
9 UK Decision Notice FS50482167 at para 9. 
10 Ibid at para 40. 
11 Wright, 2µ(ULF3LFNOHV¶RIILFLDOV³WULHGWRVXSSUHVVHPDLOV´¶The Independent, 13 September, at p 6. 
The IC, of course, ruled against Pickles and upheld the applicant blind approach which 
prevents, in most circumstances, discrimination against the identity of the applicant.12 
The saga demonstrates an active unwillingness in places to co-operate with FOI on the 
JURXQGVRIDQDSSOLFDQW¶VLGHQWLW\DQGWKHSHUFHLYHGPRWLYDWLRQ:KHUHWKLVKDSSHQV
such a response is likely to be unlawful in both jurisdictions. 
 
Both regimes are to be congratulated in ensuring equality of applicants. This is contrary 
to many other regimes. In the US, for example, in order to determine the fees 
associated with a request, the applicant is obliged to cite and conform to one of five 
µUHTXHVWHUFDWHJRULHV¶FRPPHUFLDOHGXFDWLRQDOQRQ-commercial scientific, media or 
other.13 This, in effect, deprives the requester of an applicant blind position. While the 
applicant blind approach cannot always be maintained by the home nations - 
contemporaneous dealings between applicant and authority will make identity and 
perhaps even motivation known - the position is at least recognised as fundamental to 
the proper functioning of an inclusive and universal FOI regime and the responses, as 
such, reflect that, or should at least in practice.  
 
Both Acts detail what constitutes a valid request for information. In Scotland a request is 
valid where it is in writing or in another form which, by reason of it having some 
permanency, is capable of being used for subsequent reference.14 As such, requests for 
information to Scottish public authorities recorded during telephone conversations or left 
on voicemail systems are valid requests and are subject to the provisions of FOISA 2002 
- so long as, of course, the request meets the other validity requirements involving the 
GHSRVLWRU\RIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VQDPHDQGFRUUHVSRQGHQFH7KH8.SURYLVLRQVDUHIDUPRUH
UHVWULFWLYHDQGREOLJHDYDOLGUHTXHVWIRULQIRUPDWLRQWREHDUHTXHVWZKLFKµLVLQ
ZULWLQJ¶15 It seems fair to suggest that the Scottish legislation permits those with 
literacy difficulties to seek alternative means of submitting a request. Furthermore, and 
contrary to FOIA 2000, there is an explicit provision to disabled applicants where they 
might wish to express a preference for receiving information.16 A search of both 
&RPPLVVLRQHUV¶VWDWXWRU\GHFLVLRQVVKRZVWKDWWKHUHLVDV\HWQRFDVHODZRQWKLV
matter. However, the limits of the duty at s 11(1) of FOIA 2000 - where an applicant 
may requesWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQGLVFORVXUHLQµDQRWKHUIRUPDFFHSWDEOH¶± should not prevent 
public authorities from any duty to make special arrangements in light of the Equality 
Act 2010.17 There is no doubt that a response, for example, in braille would not be 
provided to an applicant under either regime. The lack of an explicit provision in FOIA 
2000 to the rights of the disabled will not detract from other statutory duties; the explicit 
inclusion in FOISA 2002 can be considered a safeguard to the theme of FOI universalism, 
ensuring a plurality of applicants are afforded an unequivocal right to seek, receive and 
disseminate information. 
 
Alternative mediums of correspondence afforded in the digital environment also present 
themselves as relevant to the question over the validity of a request in either regime. 
For example, the SIC warned against those public authorities which might question the 
eligibility of FOI requests submitted through Facebook or Twitter.18 On this issue the IC 
concurs: 
 
                                                 
12 Grounds for discarding the applicant blind approach would be in justifying any reliance on the exemption for 
repeated or vexatious requests or where there, as a consequence of disclosure, may be a health and safety 
concern to the true applicant. 
13 US Office of Management and Budget: The statutory FOIA fee guidelines. 
14 FOISA 2002, s 8(1)(a). 
15 FOIA 2000, s 8(1)(a). 
16 FOISA, s 11. 
17 UK Decision Notice FS50388585 at para 18. 
18 Agnew, R. (2013) Response during Q&AµBurdens or Benefits: New developments in information rights, 
communication and compliance¶Scottish Centre for FOI, University of Dundee. 04 October. 
µ7KH\>UHTXHVWVVXEPLWWHGYLD7ZLWWHU@FDQEHYDOLGUHTXHVWVLQIUHHGRPRILQIRUPDWLRQ
terms and authorities that have Twitter accounts should plan for the possibility of 
UHFHLYLQJWKHP¶19 
 
So long as the other requirements of validity are met then FOI on both sides of the 
border adopts a position of technological neutrality; but furthermore in Scotland, a 
submission need not necessarily be in writing or, to that extent, even typed.  
 
Both Acts provide a right to information. And the definition of what constitutes 
µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶KDVGXULQJWKHHYROXWLRQRIFDVHODZEHHQRSLQHGE\WKHFRXUWVRIERWK
home nations. Information is defined at s 84 of FOIA 2000 subject to s 51(8) and s 
75(2): information means µLQIRUPDWLRQUHFRUGHGLQDQ\IRUP¶. Until late this has 
generally been understood to mean that a request is for the information as opposed to a 
right to the documents in which the information is contained. In other words, by all 
means, public authorities are permitted to provide the information in a format of their 
choosing, usually, for example, as an extraction from a specified document. In 
Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) v IC & Leapman [2014] UKUT 33 (AAC) the 
applicant requested the receipts provided by MPs in support of expenses claims. IPSA 
provided the applicant transcripts of those receipts. The applicant maintained a right to 
the original receipts - the documents in which the information was recorded. The case 
presented very good merits for the receipts to be disclosed, especially in light of the 
forged expense claims exposed in light of that particular scandal. Knight, from 11KBW 
Chambers, commented: 
 
µ:KDWLIDQ03KDVVXEPLWWHGIDNHGUHFHLSWVZKLFK,36$KDYHRYHUORRNHGEXWZKLFKRQ
sight of the originals show the relevant logo or trademark to be slightly wrong thus 
revealing the deception? What if it is said that a document was purely private, but the 
original reveals it to have been printed on Council notepaper? That is surely what FOIA is 
IRU¶20 
 
Judge Williams accepted WKDWDUHFHLSWZLOOW\SLFDOO\KDYHµvisual content to be seen, 
rather than read, but which may also require to be understood for the recipient to have 
appreciated the whole of the experience¶21 Marks, logos, lay-out and other details were, 
in this case, intrinsic to the information as a whole. The relaying of the extracted text 
alone neglected other information inherent in a receipt. In order to comply with FOIA 
2000, the IPSA ruling required the receipts themselves, therefore, to be disclosed by the 
public authority. 
 
A Scottish judgement some years prior, in Glasgow City Council and Dundee City Council 
v Scottish Information Commissioner [2009] CSIH 73, would appear, at first glance, to 
be contrary to the UK position. MacRoberts, a firm of solicitors, wrote to Glasgow City 
Council asking for the disclosure of specific statutory notices and insisted upon receiving 
copies of the originals, as opposed to the information contained within the documents. 
The court was satisfied that it is implicit in the definition at s 73 of FOISA 2002 that a 
distinction is drawn between the record itself and the information which is recorded in it. 
In the Glasgow case FOISA 2002 was confirmed to provide a right of access to 
information, not documentation. However, it would be wrong to suggest, while both 
cases consider the ULJKWWRµLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WKDWWKHUHLVQHFHVVDULO\ a disagreement at this 
stage RYHUZKDWPLJKWFRQVWLWXWHµLQIRUPDWLRQ¶7KHFRXUWLn the Glasgow ruling, was 
concerned with the format of disclosure as opposed to the merits of whether other 
µinformation¶ was at all embedded in a specified document. For all intent and purposes in 
the Glasgow case all information could be extracted without changing the very nature of 
                                                 
19 ICO Guidance: Can freedom of information requests be submitted using Twitter? 
20 Knight, C. µFreedom of Information: But What is InformatiRQ"7KH8SSHU7ULEXQDO2SLQHV¶Panopticon 
Blog, 28 January, accessed: http://www.panopticonblog.com/2014/01/28/freedom-of-information-but-what-is-
information-the-upper-tribunal-opines/ 
21 Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) v IC & Leapman [2014] UKUT 33 (AAC) at 22. 
the statutory notice or the reading experience. It would therefore be unwise to presume 
that receipts from, for example, MSPs for the purposes of expense claims could be 
lawfully withheld under FOISA 2002 in light of Glasgow. Unless the applicant has asked 
for the information to be provided in a digest or summary, under FOISA 2002 at s 
11(2)(b), the information provided must, in all the circumstances, µbe a complete and 
accurate version of the information contained in the VSHFLILHGGRFXPHQWV¶22 The IPSA 
ruling will no doubt be of future relevance to FOI litigation in Scotland. 
 
(OVHZKHUHLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUHQDWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
for the purposes of FOI can be very different from the home nations. Such a difference is 
not least apparent in India where the law provides a statutory right to the inspection of 
work, certified copies of original documents, and even a right to samples of material ± eg 
concrete, glass or steel perhaps being used in a construction project - held by a public 
authority or otherwise under its influence or control.23 The definition and understanding 
of what constitutes information in the UK and Scotland, in light of such distinctions 
elsewhere, are by no means out of kilter with one another. 
 
However, the legislative similarities and the differences shared in this overview so far, 
which result in little or no practical consequence to an applicant, are not reflective of the 
true narrative. While it is to be acknowledged that the pedigree of the home nation FOI 
regimes can be quite contrast to those which are afforded to applicants elsewhere in the 
world, there are differences north and south of the border also. Such differences mark 
more than mere nuances between the regimes but a divergence in the trajectory of the 
rights afforded to the applicants and operational practicalities of FOIA 2000 and FOISA 
2002 since enactment.  
 
Pronounced divergence between the home nation regimes 
 
Both regimes contain provisions which allow a public authority to refuse to comply with a 
request for information where the cost of compliance is estimated to exceed a set limit. 
The set limit and the calculation of how an estimate of costs is achieved provides the 
first of the great distinctions in FOISA 2002 from its UK counterpart. Indeed those 
academics and practitioners familiar with FOIA 2000 alone might very well view the 
Scottish regime as somewhat alien in this respect, and others. 
 
At s 12 of FOISA 2002 a Scottish public authority need not comply with a request for 
information if the authority estimates that the cost of compliance will exceed the amount 
set out in Reg 5 of the Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2004 (Scottish Fees Regulations). In Scotland, the public authority is 
entitled to charge for the direct and indirect costs incurred in µORFDWLQJUHWULHYLQJDQG
providing informatioQ¶.24 The authority is not entitled to charge for any costs incurred in 
determining whether it actually holds the information.25 In other words, the search to 
substantiate if information is indeed held is free.  And, furthermore, the authority is 
prohibited from charging for any costs incurred in determining whether the information 
should or should not be disclosed. 
 
For the purposes of the FOIA 2000 cost exemption, at s 9, the appropriate rules are 
defined in The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) 
Regulations 2004 SI No. 3244 (UK Fees Regulations). The activities which may be taken 
into account when dealing with a request for information are different from the Scottish 
regime: Reg 4(3) permits charging for determining whether the information is held; 
locating the information; retrieving the information; and extracting the information. The 
initial search, contrary to FOISA 2002, is chargeable. If it will take time, too long a time, 
                                                 
22 SIC Briefing Series: Guidance on validity of requests at p 4 para 4.1. 
23 Right to Information Act 2005, at s 2(f). 
24 Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) Regulations 2004, Reg 3(1). 
25 Ibid at Reg 3(2)(a). 
to determine whether the information is held, then there will be no statutory 
requirement to provide it under FOIA 2000; the cost exemption is engaged where the 
staff time required by any authority to make DµKHOGQRWKHOG¶ determination exceeds the 
prescribed amount. Conversely, public authorities in the UK with poor recordkeeping will 
be rewarded. One could go further: Why digitise or improve record management if in 
doing so would lead to an increase in compliance with FOI requests? FOI should 
encourage good recordkeeping practice and so the charging for the determination seems 
counterintuitive, to say the least. 
 
In Scotland, where the projected costs do not exceed £100, no fee is be payable.26 
Where the estimate exceeds £100 but does not exceed £600, the fee, if indeed asked of 
the applicant by the authority in any case, is not to exceed 10 per cent of the difference 
between the projected costs and £100.27 The maximum cost, therefore, is £50 (10 per 
cent of (£600-£100)). The estimate of the cost of staff time in locating, retrieving or 
providing the information is capped at just £15 per hour per member of staff in 
Scotland.28 On staff cost alone the regulations therefore permit at least 40 hours of 
dedicated time per request for the prescribed activities in responding to a request. 
However, the UK Fees Regulations indicate that staff time is to be charged at the flat 
rate of £25 per hour.29 The appropriate limit is currently £600 for central government 
and £450 for all other UK public authorities. 
 
There are two important issues to evaluate in the monetary limitations afforded: First, 
the UK regulations equate to 24 hours of dedicated time per request submitted to central 
government or 18 hours work for any other public authority. It is, therefore, 16 hours 
and 22 hours, respectively, less than what any Scottish public authority will dedicate to a 
submission under FOISA 2002. And second, a note on the wording of the respective 
UHJXODWLRQV7KH6FRWWLVKUDWHLVQRWRQO\ORZHUEXWLWLVµFDSSHG¶DVRSSRVHGWREHLQJD
µIODW-UDWH¶,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHQXPEHURIKRXUVGHGLFDWHGWRWKHDSSURSULDWHWDVNV
associated with any FOI request might indeed even exceed that of 40 hours in Scotland 
where the authority utilises the assistance of a lower waged individual. In Scottish 
Decision 211/2012, the SIC was not convinced by the Government in Edinburgh that the 
task, as a whole, of responding to a request for the engagements of a special adviser 
justified the maximum hourly rate of £15 per hour.30 In Decisions which have followed, 
the Scottish Government has altered the hourly rate in calculating the cost estimate. In 
6FRWWLVK'HFLVLRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VHVWLPDWHIRUUHWULHYLQJLQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJ
to the knighthood of Sir Brian Souter was calculated on the civil service staff grade at 
A3. This was appropriate for the staff who would undertake the search on Objective31 at 
£9.50 per hour.32 Clearly, public service wages are of little, or no difference outside 
London at least, between the nations. But the cost limitations and their application 
present a barrier to the extent of work which will be dedicated to a response and the 
amount of information disclosable in so far as that which can be accomplished within the 
cost of staff time. The Scottish applicant is in a far more favourable position as a result. 
 
There are also differences concerning the rules of aggregation relevant to a public 
DXWKRULW\¶V calculation of costs for the purposes of the cost exemption. In Scotland, 
multiple requests contained in the same piece of correspondence, from the same 
applicant, are read as self-standing submissions, as opposed to constituent parts of the 
same request. In Scottish Decision 055/2013 the applicant submitted ten separate 
letters to the Scottish Ministers requesting information regarding the knighthood 
awarded to Sir Brian Souter and the Ministers' involvement in the honours system. The 
                                                 
26 Ibid at Reg 4(2). 
27 Ibid at Reg 4(3). 
28 Ibid at Reg 3(2)(b). 
29 Ibid at Reg 7(5). 
30 para 34. 
31 Objective is the Scottish Government's electronic records and document management system. 
32 para 65. 
ten letters contained 35 separate information requests. Each request constitutes a 
different request for the purposes of FOISA 2002 and, as such, each of the 35 requests 
assumed its own cost limit. Similarly, in Decision 161/2012 where the applicant asked 
the SPS for information relating to the procurement of a laptop facility and any 
correspondence relating to the implementation of a policy for prisoner access to such a 
facility, this required the need for two distinct cost estimates to be undertaken by the 
authority. $JJUHJDWLRQRIDQ\RQHSHUVRQ¶VUHTXHVWVLVQRWV\VWHPDWLFLQGHHd, it is quite 
to the contrary: 
 
µ,Q a small number of cases, the Commissioner has found that multiple requests made in 
the same letter or email are so interconnected that the requests should be treated as 
one for the purpose of determining whether the cost of complying with the request 
exceHGV¶33 
 
,WLVLQWKHVHµVPDOOQXPEHU¶LQZKLFKUHTXHVWVLQSUDFWLFHDUHHYHUDJJUHJDWHG,Q
Scottish Decision 134/2012, the Commissioner was satisfied that the applicants six 
requests, for minutes of meetings held by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, could be considered as one because separating the information required to 
address and calculate the six requests was a contrived affair. The SIC said: 
 
µ(VVHQWLDOO\RQDQ\UHDVRQDEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQUHTXHVWHGLVVXFKWKDWWKe 
identification and location of what is required to address each point cannot realistically 
be separatHGRXWLQWRGLVFUHWHWDVNV>«@¶34 
 
Aggregation is, however, systematic at the coal face of the UK FOI regime due to lax 
rules governing the practice. At s 12(4) of FOIA 2000 a public authority can aggregate 
the cost of complying with two or more requests subject to the conditions at Reg 5 of the 
UK Fees Regulations: providing the requests come from the same individual within a 60 
working day period and concern similar information. In UK Decision FS50503796, the 
DSSOLFDQW¶VUHTXHVWVIRULQIRUPDWLRQKHOGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQHURIWKH0HWURSROLWDQ3ROLFH
Service - which concerned surveillance operations - were aggregated and upheld as 
exempt at s 12 of FOIA 2000 by the IC on appeal. What seems troubling, in this case 
and others, is the test for lawful aggregation. The requests, in FS50503796, sought 
information regarding the number of surveillance operations undertaken, details relating 
to staff commitment and the number of persons under surveillance. The information 
requested was not held as an aggregate record. The information was not 
indistinguishable from one request to the next, as the Scottish regime would have 
understood. The UK test for aggregation merely depended XSRQDWHVWRIµVLPLODULW\WR 
DQ\H[WHQW¶.35 It is based on mere thematic judgement making aggregation of any one 
SHUVRQ¶VUHTXHVWs systematic. Aggregation in Scotland, to the contrary, depends upon 
whether separating the information required to address and calculate the interconnected 
ZRXOGEHµDZKROO\DUWLILFLDOH[HUFLVH¶36 The test for aggregation is more than a little 
inconsistent between the home nation regimes. The UK Fees Rules, in comparative 
terms, present an impediment to the rights of applicants under FOIA 2000. 
 
FOI regimes the world-over employ set times for any public authority to handle a 
request for information; but some regimes employ far less ambiguous rules than others. 
Scottish public authorities have a statutory duty to respond within 20 working days (or 
30 if transferred to the Keeper of Records).37 At s 73 of )2,6$DµZRUNLQJGD\¶is 
defined as any day other than a Saturday, Sunday, Christmas Day or a day which 
otherwise constitutes a bank holiday in Scotland. The deadline for response under FOIA 
LVKRZHYHUIDUOHVVFOHDUDOORZLQJDSXEOLFDXWKRULW\PRUHWLPHµsuch time as is 
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37 FOISA 2002, s 10. 
reasonable in the circumstances¶ZKHUHWKHDXWKRULW\KDVQRWUHDFKHGDFRQFOXVLRQWR
the public interest test in relation to the duty or confirm or deny or in relation to its 
application of a relevant exemption.38 A response must, in any case, be given within 20 
working days in compliance with s 10(1), however, that response could be a mere 
indication that no decision has yet been reached and an estimate of the date by which 
the authority expects that a decision will be reached.39  And unlike other regimes, such 
as the US, there is no statutory entitlement whatsoever to the expedition of a request in 
the event of such delay. The UK regime has also lifted the time limits for certain public 
authorities in order to effectively suspend information requests which fall outside of the 
working season.40 It appears incredibly difficult to see how ever the right to know can be 
effectively extinguished during, for example, the recess weeks of a scheduled public 
authority. While a suspension of FOI might be all very well for the tightening of the 
public purse, it is hard to justify removing the right of access while, at the same time, 
acknowledging it to be a fundamental human right.41 Applicants under FOISA 2002 are 
not impinged by such restrictions. 
 
Scottish public authorities must respond within 20 working days following the date of 
receipt of the requirement for a review where the applicant, who is dissatisfied with the 
way in which the public authority has dealt with a request for information, seeks one.42 
This is the first stage in the Scottish appeals process and provides the authority with an 
opportunity to re-consider the disclosure of information before an applicant approaches 
the SIC for a decision. FOIA 2000, to the contrary, offers no such statutory duty; a 
public authority has no obligation to undertake an internal review. This is incredibly 
disappointing when we consider institutions with some of the largest expenditure 
budgets - of course, those which in all the circumstances constitute UK public authorities 
and fall under FOIA 2000 - refuse to re-consider any refusal notice. The BBC, with an 
annual turnover of £5.09bn, £3.6bn from the license fee, having been plunged into a 
legitimacy crisis as a result of, among other things, a culture of secrecy, even today 
refuses to implement any internal review procedure. The applicant is instead directed to 
the UK IC should they wish to appeal a refusal. Where a UK public authority fails to offer 
an internal review, the complaints process, for the purposes of FOIA 2000, can be 
GHVFULEHGDVKDYLQJEHHQµH[KDXVWHG¶DWV- although, in reality, it never 
commenced. This exhaustion provides the legal basis for the IC to proceed in making his 
own determination. But the IC can take months and in some instances - 23 in the 
session of 2012/13 - years to conclude a determination.43 An approach to the IC, for 
many, is the first stage of the appeals process when requesting information under FOIA 
2000. 
 
The Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFOI) describes the UK regime as employing 
µWKHPRVWHODERUDWHDSSHDOVSURFHVVHVRIDQ\LQWKHZRUOG¶.44 An appeal involves the 
possibility of a non-obligatory review by the public authority of its decision first, then a 
determination by the IC. On a point of law an appeal can then be made to the 
,QIRUPDWLRQ7ULEXQDO¶VORZHUWKHQXSSHUWLHUWKH+LJK&RXUW the Court of Appeal and, in 
turn, to the Supreme Court where necessary. The time taken for a decision and the 
appeal mechanisms leaves an unfortunate assault course for the applicant under FOIA 
2000 to manoeuvre, in which they could be participant to an overtly legalistic battle of 
years for a  disclosure ± or final refusal. 
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Under the Scottish FOI regime, a mandatory internal review by a public authority is 
followed, where necessary, by an approach to the SIC for a decision. Where the SIC fails 
to reach a decision on an appeal after four months, or other reasonable period, the 
applicant is invited, should they so wish, to approach the Court of Session for a judicial 
review. The SIC is the final arbitrator. Scotland rejected the extra appellate tier for 
appeal. On a point of law an appeal against a decision from the SIC is instead made to 
Scotland's supreme civil court, namely, the Court of Session. This is equivalent to the UK 
High Court. An appeal can then be made to the Supreme Court in London where, of 
course, it has power to hear a case concerned with human rights issues under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court serves as the final court of 
appeal in such matters; to date just one case has been considered here.45 The Scottish 
system provides a distinctively less formal and far speedier appeal system. 
 
The Scottish White Paper on Freedom of Information stressed the importance for the 
ULJKWRIDFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQWRDSSO\EURDGO\ZLWKH[HPSWLRQVGUDZQµDVQDUURZly and 
SUHFLVHO\DVSRVVLEOH¶.46 This is in contrast to the drafting of FOIA 2000. The White Paper, 
An Open Scotland, noted: 
 
µFocussing on the number [WP emphasis] of exemptions in any given regime is not, 
however, particularly constructive or helpful. A regime with a small number of very 
broad, all-encompassing exemptions, would be significantly less open than one with a 
great number of exemptions where these are drawn tightly to protect specific categories 
RIVHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶47 
 
An Open Scotland included an annex of proposed exemptions which diverged from the 
UK limitations. First, the White Paper outlined that where information related to 
incomplete analysis, research or statistics which, upon premature disclosure, could be 
µPLVOHDGLQJRUGHSULYHWKHKROGHURISULRULW\RISXEOLFDWLRQRUFRPPHUFLDOYDOXH¶WKHUH
would exist a prejudice-based exemption.48 In turn the inclusion of s 27(2) in FOISA 
2002 allowed Scottish public authorities to withhold information if the information is 
obtained in the course of, or derived from, a programme of research. 
 
In practice the exemption prevents a pre-emptive disclosure which would be to the 
commercial detriment of the author and university49 whom, after all, may wish to 
translate the research into a commercial publication, patent or, in turn, even a spin-off. 
$VHDUFKRIWKH6,&¶VGHFLVLons by the author determines her office to have never needed 
to formally uphold the provision on appeal. There is no case law. 
 
Universities subject to FOIA 2000 and not FOISA 2002, however, at present, 
systematically rely upon two exemptions in substitutiRQRI6FRWODQG¶VUHVHDUFK
exemption, namely, by way of s 22(1) as the information would be intended for future 
publication and/or s 43(2) as it is likely to prejudice commercial interests.50 The UK IC 
must be satisfied that, at the time of a request, it was the intention of the public 
authority to publish the requested information in its entirety in order to uphold section 
22(1).51 But it is inherently difficult for a research academy to foresee the information, if 
any, destined for future publication during a project. 
 
The need for a specific research exemption, previously identified in the Scottish White 
Paper, was recognised during the UK post-legislative scrutiny of FOIA 2000 in 2011. 
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Responding to oral questions academics stated the UK exemptions used in substitution 
were not fit for purpose: principally, time limits for publication are peculiar to universities 
and the competitive characteristics to research are unique.52 The blanket approach was 
untenable: 
 
µ>7@KHUHLVDVSHFLILFSUREOHPIRURQJRLQJresearch in universities which needs to be 
addressed by provisions on the lines of those operating in Scotland under the Freedom of 
InfRUPDWLRQ6FRWODQG$FW¶53 
 
The Westminster Intellectual Property Bill, at the time of writing awaiting consideration 
of amendments by the House of Lords, will achieve this task. The Bill will bring about a 
prejudice-based exemption for research data after s 22 of FOIA 2000, with a near-
identical insertion to s 27(2) of FOISA 2002.54 
 
FOISA 2002 exemptions are tightly drawn and relate to specific types and categories of 
information.  ,WLVDQH[DPSOHRIZKHUHWKH8.UHJLPHKDVORRNHGWR6FRWODQG¶VJUHDW
number of exemptions which are drawn, very precisely, in rejection of the µone size fits 
DOO¶)2,$GUDIWLQJ. Despite this, heed should be taken to the omission of the test for 
µVXEVWDQWLDOSUHMXGLFH¶GUDZQLQWKH6FRWWLVK$FWIRUPHUHµSUHMXGLFH¶LQWKH8.$FWPDMRU
differences still present themselves in the reach and extent of transparency even where 
attempts are made to align the trajectories of the regimes. 
 
If the public interest in disclosing the information is equal to or greater than the public 
interest in maintaining the exemption, then the information must be disclosed under 
FOISA 2002.55 Likewise, if the public interest is equal on both sides of the interest test 
under FOIA 2000, then the information must be released.56 The presumption, therefore, 
in both regimes is in favour of disclosure. However, the key is not the presumption, 
which is all very well, but the weighting exercise which determines when such a 
presumption can be made. 
 
In circumstances where a weighting exercise is to be undertaken, the UK regime 
employs a harsher hurdle to achieve any disclosure. Refusal notices under FOIA 2000 
need merely demonstrate grounds of prejudice, whereas in Scotland the authority must 
demonstrate substantial prejudice in order to withhold information. This is particularly 
peculiar where exemptions are identical to one another in either Act such as the 
proposed research exemption, or at section 28 of both FOIA 2000 and FOISA 2002: 
relations between the administrations of the United Kingdom. It is therefore foreseeable 
that information that is withheld under FOIA 2000 may be disclosed to the world under 
the equivalent FOISA 2002 provision where held by a Scottish public authority.57 
 
There are other examples too where the Scottish administration has looked south and 
has considered, at least, convergence in order to join up the regimes. The Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG), passed just before the 2010 UK general 
election, created a new absolute exemption in FOIA 2000 for correspondence with the 
Crown and other members of the royal family. By virtue of the amendment, section 37 of 
FOIA 2000 became absolute in respect of: 
 
x communications with the Sovereign; 
x communications with the heir or second in line to the Throne; and 
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x communications with a person who has subsequently become heir to or second in 
line to the Throne.58 
 
The public interest test does not apply to the royal exemption and nor does it apply to 
the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny whether that information is held. The 
Scottish Government, during extensive debate during the passage of the Freedom of 
Information (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill, appeared willing to follow suit: 
 
µ6FRWWLVK0LQLVWHUVFRQVLGHUWKDWLWLVDSSURSULDWHWREURDGO\PLUURUWKHDPHQGPHQWV
introduced by CRAG in the interests of a common approach throughout the UK to the 
treatment of informaWLRQUHODWLQJWR+HU0DMHVW\¶59 
 
Despite early wavering, however, the Freedom of Information (Amendment) (Scotland) 
Act 2013 made no retraction of a public interest test to the synonymous royal exemption 
at s 41(a) of FOISA 2002. The exemption applies to information too that relates either to 
communications with the Queen, other members of the Royal Family or the Royal 
Household. While the exemptions contained within both regimes are classed based - 
which means that information falling within the description automatically engages the 
exemption regardless of whether there would be any harm in disclosure ± FOISA 2002 
requires the authority to consider the public interest test. The parallel regimes do not 
abide by any universal rule as to when a public interest test is relevant. In Scottish 
Decision 105/2007 a single minute item relating to her Majesty, which engaged the 
exemption at s 41(a) of FOISA 2002 - which would otherwise have rendered the 
information absolutely exempt under FOIA 2000 as amended by CRAG - was disclosed 
RQDSSHDOXSRQWKH6,&¶VDVVHVVPHQW of the public interest test.60 Further disclosures 
from within Scotland will follow where they would otherwise fail, or suffer delay, under 
the amended FOIA 2000. In Scotland the public interest test, where it is applicable to a 
synonymous exemption shared by both regimes, in any case, will always require a far 
higher barrier of harm to be demonstrated by an authority in order for that authority to 
lawful withhold information from an applicant. The Scottish regime is, therefore, more 
disclosure prone. 
 
An additional metric: political will 
 
While there are synonymous exemptions which operate differently, there are also 
exemptions otherwise omitted in FOISA 2002 when compared to its home nation 
counterpart. One such lack of any corresponding provision in FOISA 2002 is the FOIA 
2000 exemption for parliamentary privilege at s 34. It is an omission perhaps more 
reflective of a divergence in political culture at Holyrood. The Scotland Act 1998 does 
have a number of provisions designed to give protection to the Scottish Parliament so 
that it can conduct orderly business; but there is no concept of parliamentary privilege in 
relation to Holyrood or its members in the sense understood by Westminster. The lack of 
an exemption demonstrates a far deeper distinction: a belief that sovereignty is held in 
the public gallery rather than by Parliament itself or the Crown. The relationship between 
the state and the governed could be said therefore to have been expressed by the 
omission of privilege in FOISA 2002. Holyrood, for the purposes of FOISA 2002, is a 
public authority like any other scheduled; there are no explicit exemptions or even 
derogations for thematic information. The lack of privilege was undoubtedly a 
contributing factor to the differences in reaction to both parliamentarian expenses 
scandals where one authority, namely, Holyrood, undertook a reactionary transparency 
revolution while the other, at the House of Commons, cowered while members sought 
curtailment to the FOI law. 
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Freedom of information is an awkward fit in a country, Britain that is, which is 
considered to govern and conducts its affairs with a cloak of secrecy second-to-no-other 
among the advanced liberal democracies, particularly where this concerns the scheduling 
of the Houses of Parliament as public authorities for the purposes of FOIA 2000. FOI is 
something of an affront to the conventions of traditional constitutional governance, 
undermining, for one, parliamentary sovereignty and privilege. FOI challenges many of 
these traditions including the collective responsibility of ministers to Parliament and the 
tactical advantage to a government within the parliamentary environment of controlling 
the timing and circumstances of information disclosures. If either House decides that 
disclosure of information would infringe upon such privileges, it is, upon agreement of 
the Speaker of the House of Commons, or the Clerk of the Parliaments on behalf of the 
House of Lords, permitted an absolute exemption from disclosure. In practice the 
information which can trigger the exemption includes committee reports and drafts not 
otherwise published; memos submitted to committees; or correspondence between 
members, House officials, ministers and government officials, where the correspondence 
directly and specifically relates to House or committee proceedings.61 
 
There is, in other parts, a distinct unwillingness in Scotland to rely upon other provisions 
of FOISA 2002, which are, in actual fact, shared with FOIA 2000. The UK government 
appetite for issuing ministerial vetoes, in effect overriding any statutory decision which 
compels the disclosure of information, is not shared by Edinburgh. The UK has exercised 
the power to veto a disclosure now on seven occasions. The sixth veto in Evans found 
the reliance, at s. 53 of FOIA 2000, to be, in that case, unlawful. The government is to 
appeal. The case itself has been amply covered in detail elsewhere. Scotland has never 
relied on its power to veto a disclosure at s 52 of FOISA 2002. It would seem a difficult 
provision to rely upon in any case: the veto only applies to the class-based exemptions; 
tKHLQIRUPDWLRQUHTXHVWHGPXVWPHHWDWKUHVKROGRIµH[FHSWLRQDOVHQVLWLYLW\¶; and the 
First Minister himself must submit the veto to the SIC only after consultation with his 
ministers.62 New Zealand, which like Scotland requires collective cabinet responsibility 
for any executive override, has not relied upon it since 1987. And Australia has since 
abolished its veto altogether.63 In a country, a small one at that, usually more familiar 
with coalition government and a distinct lack of ceremony in public service, it seems the 
veto in Scotland, bearing in mind the conditions of its use, might very well, at least, fall 
into a state of desuetude. The power and extent of the veto in the UK, meanwhile, is 
being fought for by the government in a feud with the press. 
 
UK government reliance on the exemptions might reflect deeper distinctions in political 
culture north and south of the border. The spats between the UK IC and senior 
ministers, such as Gove and Pickles, are an all-too-common feature of UK FOI. And party 
colours too impact upon the scope, power and trajectory of the FOI regime. The UK 
appetite for privatising public services to third parties, for example, effectively reduces 
the scope of FOI and, in turn, removes the prospect of public scrutiny. Privatising prisons 
and some NHS services, to name but a few, in England and Wales, is contrary to the 
politics of Holyrood. The divisions of FOI will therefore continue to diverge between the 
nations as those organisations scheduled for the purposes of FOIA 2000 retire from 
designation; in Scotland they will remain. Furthermore, the designation of public 
authorities in Scotland, for the purposes of FOISA 2002, has, to the contrary, been 
readily expanding.64 The IC is currently looking into the issue of transparency in the 
outsourcing of public sector contracts ± it is a growing concern.65 And the likes of 
Margaret Hodge, adversary to secrecy and chair of the Public Accounts Select 
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Committee, have spoken out for an end to the curtailment of transparency as a result of 
outsourcing, especially in the aftermath of the G4S and Serco scandal - although the UK 
government seems far less keen.66 
 
The spirit of the regime is perhaps stronger in Scotland where its drafting was influenced 
by Liberal Democrats, has been amended and strengthened by the autonomy-
courageous SNP since 2007, all-the-time inside a stateless-nation much less appreciative 
of ceremony and tradition and where parliamentary sovereignty is not enshrined. The 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VVL[)2,SULQFLSOHVXQGHUOLQHWKH)2,UHJLPHDVQHFHVVDU\IRURSHQ
democratic government. This cultural divergence has not been a concern of this article, 
not too any great extent at least, but these are considerations which are intrinsic to the 
evolution of FOI and the trajectories of the respective laws. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The overtures made to Scottish FOI appear to be justified - certainly, at least, in 
comparison to FOIA 2000. The rights afforded to applicants and the designated list of 
scheduled public authorities have been protected and expanded in FOISA 2002 since 
enactment. This evaluation highlighted in the course of its overview that universalism, 
the rules governing the cost exemption, the SIC¶s rulings on aggregation, the 
exemptions themselves, of course, and the weighting exercise as part of the public 
interest test, in all the circumstances, afford pronounced advantages to the applicant 
under FOISA 2002. The amendments which curtail the rights of the applicant under FOIA 
2000 have been, broadly speaking, avoided in Scotland.  
 
It is perhaps surprising that divergence has reached a point where a disclosure of 
synonymous information held by a Scottish public authority may be otherwise exempt 
should the same request have been considered under FOIA 2000 by a UK public 
authority. It can be said then that the Scottish regime does indeed offer far stronger 
information rights to applicants on the ground in real-world practice. The regime is one 
which is certainly, as a result, more disclosure prone than its UK counterpart. 
 
An FOI disclosure to the author, in research for this article, revealed Scots civil servants 
expected convergence of the regimes in light of the conclusion to the UK post-legislative 
scrutiny of FOIA 2000. The divergence would cease, it was thought.67 It has not. And it 
seems terribly unlikely there will be any convergence in the near-future in light of, 
among other reasons, current mutterings at Westminster.  
 
The legislative differences might indeed very well only constitute one half of the story; it 
was the half presented in this article. The other side to the narrative is the disparity in 
the political culture between the parliamentary centres. The eagerness to reverse-
engineer and scale back the rights to applicants under FOIA 2000 is only complemented 
by the ever-shrinking scope and shortening list of designated authorities in light of the 
privatisation in England and Wales of public services to third parties. The fault-lines 
between the nations are already present. Further divergence in the law and practice of 
freedom of information between the UK and Scotland seems now to be inevitable.  
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